Whether mathematical truths are syntactical or empirical might seem merely an academic topic. However, it becomes a practical concern as soon as we consider the role of questions. For if we inquire as to the truth of a mathematical statement, this question must be meaningless for Carnap, as its truth or falsity is certain in advance due to its purely syntactical nature. In contrast, for Mill such a question is as valid as any other. These differing views have their consequences (...) for contemporaryerotetic logic. (shrink)

Whether mathematical truths are syntactical or empirical might seem merely an academic topic. However, it becomes a practical concern as soon as we consider the role of questions. For if we inquire as to the truth of a mathematical statement, this question must be meaningless for Carnap, as its truth or falsity is certain in advance due to its purely syntactical nature. In contrast, for Mill such a question is as valid as any other. These differing views have their consequences (...) for contemporary erotetic logic.Pitanje jesu li matematičke istine sintaktičke ili empirijske može se činiti puko akademskom temom. Međutim, to postaje praktično pitanje čim razmotrimo ulogu pitanjâ. Jer pitamo li za istinitost neke matematičke tvrdnje, za Carnapa ovo pitanje mora biti besmisleno, budući da je njezina istinitost ili neistinitost unaprijed izvjesna zahvaljujući njezinoj puko sintaktičkoj naravi. Nasuprot ovome, za Milla je takvo pitanje valjano kao i bilo koje drugo pitanje. Ova različita shvaćanja imaju svoje posljedice za suvremenu erotetičku logiku. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Threat to Selfhood: Moral Distress and the Psychiatric Training CultureEsther NathansonWhile many medical specialties offer to heal, or even cure, psychiatry—uniquely—places the doctor–patient relationship at the center of the therapeutic effort. Psychiatrists must possess a complex and challenging combination of broad medical knowledge, finely honed interpersonal and analytic skills and confidence in their abilities, despite limited understanding of the workings of the brain. Inpatient psychiatry in particular demands (...) a degree of strength to withstand emotional, and sometimes physical, assault from patients who may be suicidal, desperate, paranoid, aggressive or delusional. Beyond these abilities, a good psychiatrist must have robust but ‘therapeutically porous’ emotional boundaries that allow genuine empathy for the patient but, at the same time, limit internalization of the patient’s anguish as the practitioner’s own: the exquisite balance of ‘self–versus–other’ in the therapeutic encounter.Unfortunately, during my psychiatry residency in the UK, development of these intangible but essential boundaries was entirely absent from the curriculum. Early in training I struggled with my tendency to become an emotional chameleon with feelings and energies buffeted around by the prevailing emotions of each patient that walked through the door. I felt that patients expected me to offer tidy explanations for their suffering and provide answers to profound questions of meaning; to make the world a safe and understandable place. Given the complexity of mental illness and its interplay with social circumstances this was naïve and, I now realize, often unnecessary, but the weight of responsibility was unbearable. I was also completely unprepared for the intensity of human suffering I saw, and wholly unready to provide the level of interpersonal engagement required for genuine healing. My own emotional integrity felt threatened by the depth of patients’ needs, and my response—both physical and emotional—was intense and frightening.Much of my distress resulted from the profound and inevitable tension between the empathy necessary to comprehend patients’ experiences, which were often extreme and bewildering, and the need for resilience and self–protection at a time when my grasp of psychological theories and treatment practices was still rudimentary. I felt guilty that patients bore the brunt of my inexperience, and duplicitous purporting to help while burdening them with intolerable drug side–effects and stigmatizing, albeit effective, treatments such as electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Time constraints and guidance from senior faculty encouraged expediency over treatment efficacy or durability; psychopharmacology was prioritized over the psychotherapeutic techniques and psychosocial interventions I found more effective for many patients. During the phase of our training that took place in a rambling, now defunct, asylum in the U.K, visits to the locked ward, which was reserved for patients considered a danger to others, were usually prompted by nurses’ requests for chemical restraint, the ‘pharmaceutical strait–jacket’. I was deeply uncomfortable with the role of ‘restrainer’ but had insufficient experience or seniority to propose other methods. It was only when, years later, I investigated re–training in the U.S that the senior psychiatry resident at a well–known program told me gently, ‘Oh, we assume that students will have a breakdown in their first year, so we have systems in place to help’. I’ll never forget those words; they are, to this day, the only validation of the emotional toll of my early training years.Adding to my discomfort were various ethically dubious administrative practices, the most troubling being the clinic’s unwillingness to disclose to patients that we were trainees, with little clinical experience. Senior faculty were dismissive when I asked whether my first psychotherapy patient had been told I was a trainee, indeed that I had never conducted psychotherapy before. My question was greeted with amusement and an assurance that, although she had not been told, I (not the patient, interestingly) would do fine.Due to the large number of no–shows in psychiatric outpatient clinics it was also standard practice to triple–book appointment times on the [End Page 115] assumption that one or more patients would fail to attend. Not uncommonly, more than one patient would arrive for the same appointment, leaving others to suffer agonizing waits that were often intensified by the deep discomfort... (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine whether United States -style regulatory intervention to encourage whistle-blowing can be immediately effective if transplanted into another country with a distinctly different historical cultural background and institutional system. A total of 98 U.S. and 84 German accountants participated in a laboratory experiment relating to a case of financial statement fraud. The provision of anti-retaliation protection and monetary rewards for whistle-blowing were manipulated and participants were asked to assume the role of an internal (...) auditor. We hypothesize and find that the provision of anti-retaliation protection and monetary rewards encourage U.S. accountants to blow the whistle. In contrast, among German accountants, where their country features a historical fear and distrust of whistle-blowers, U.S.-style regulatory interventions are less effective. Together, our findings provide strong support for the theory of path-dependence, suggesting that whistle-blowing regulation should not be uniformly transplanted without due consideration of the unique history and culture of a country. (shrink)

Anthropologists and philosophers initiate a dialogue on trust and hope. The book combines work between scholars from different universities in the U.S. and Denmark and cuts across differences in national contexts and academic style.

An increased focus on fake news and misinformation is currently emerging. But what does it mean when information is designated as “fake?” Research on deception has focused on lies of commission, in which people disclose something false as true. However, people can also lie by omission, by withholding important yet true information. In this research, we investigate when people are more likely to tell a lie of omission. In three studies, with tests among undergraduates, online sample respondents, and candidates for (...) U.S. Senate, we found that people in a gain frame were more likely to lie by omission (vs. commission), and vice versa for a loss frame. Moreover, participants rated lies of commission in a gain frame as the least acceptable type of deception, suggesting why people may avoid telling this kind of lie. Overall, our results emphasize that from frame-to-frame, lying is not only different in degree but different in kind. (shrink)

Background Nurses experienced intense ethical and moral challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our 2020 qualitative parent study of frontline nurses’ experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic identified ethics as a cross-cutting theme with six subthemes: moral dilemmas, moral uncertainty, moral distress, moral injury, moral outrage, and moral courage. We re-analyzed ethics-related findings in light of refined definitions of ethics concepts. Research aim To analyze frontline U.S. nurses’ experiences of ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic. Research design Qualitative analysis using a directed content (...) methodology. Participants and research context The study included 43 nurses from three major metropolitan academic medical centers and one community hospital in the northeastern, mid-Atlantic, midwestern, and western United States. Ethical considerations Participant privacy and data confidentiality were addressed. Findings Moral dilemmas arose from many situations, most frequently related to balancing safety and patient care. Moral uncertainty commonly arose from lacking health information or evidence about options. Moral distress occurred when nurses knew the right thing to do, but were prevented from doing so, including with end-of-life issues. Moral injury (accompanied by suffering, shame, or guilt) occurred after doing, seeing, or experiencing wrongdoing, often involving authority figures. Nurses expressed moral outrage at events and people within and outside healthcare. Despite difficult ethical situations, some nurses exemplified moral courage, sometimes by resisting policies they perceived as preventing compassionate care, guided by thinking about what was best for patients. Discussion This content analysis of ethics-related subthemes revealed conceptual characteristics and clarified distinctions with corresponding exemplars. Conceptual clarity may inform responses and interventions to address ethical quandaries in nursing practice. Conclusions Ethics education in nursing must address the moral dilemmas of pandemics, disasters, and other crises. Nurses need time and resources to heal from trying to provide the best care when no ideal option was available. (shrink)

Our theoretical understanding of individual differences can be used as a tool to test and refine theory. Individual differences are useful because judgments, including philosophically relevant intuitions, are the predictable products of the fit between adaptive psychological mechanisms (e.g., heuristics, traits, skills, capacities) and task constraints. As an illustration of this method and its potential implications, our target article used a canonical, representative, and affectively charged judgment task to reveal a relationship between the heritable personality trait extraversion and some compatabilist (...) judgments. In the current Reply, we further clarify major theoretical implications of these data and outline potential opportunities and obstacles for this methodology. Discussion focuses on (1) the need for theoretically grounded a priori predictions; (2) the use of precise process level data and theory; (3) the possibility of convergent validity as personality is known to predict life experiences and outcomes; and (4) the fundamentally adaptive nature of cognition. (shrink)

When the side effect of an action involves moral considerations (e.g. when a chairman’s pursuit of profits harms the environment) it tends to influence theory-of-mind judgments. On average, bad side effects are judged intentional whereas good side effects are judged unintentional. In a series of two experiments, we examined the largely uninvestigated roles of individual differences in this judgment asymmetry. Experiment 1 indicated that extraversion accounted for variations in intentionality judgments, controlling for a range of other general individual differences (e.g. (...) working memory, self-control). Experiment 2 indicated that extraversion’s influence was partially mediated by more specific variations in intentional action concepts. A priming manipulation also provided causal evidence of judgment instability and bias. Results suggest that the intentional action judgment asymmetry is multiply determined, reflecting the interplay of individual differences and judgment biases. Implications and the roles of individual differences in judgment and decision-making research are discussed. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups (...) of people who have specific and diverse intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility offers the possibility for theoretical advancement in philosophy and psychology, and may in part explain why some perennial philosophical debates have proven intractable. (shrink)

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects (...) or other static mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and its previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the coupled dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, planning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and model based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effects and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The demonstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dynamic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may be continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognitive act of “knowing” not only in infancy but also in everyday activities throughout the life span. Key Words: cognitive development; dynamical systems theory; embodied cognition; infant development; motor control; motor planning; perception and action. (shrink)

Although it makes some progress, McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) proposal is limited because (1) the argument for adaptive misbelief is not new, (2) arguments overextend the evidence provided, and (3) the alleged sufficient conditions are not as prohibitive as suggested. We offer alternative perspectives and evidence, including individual differences research, indicating that adaptive misbeliefs are likely much more widespread than implied.

In this commentary, we point to guidelines for performing human neuroimaging studies and their reporting in microbiota-gut-brain articles. Moreover, we provide a view on interpretational issues in MGB studies, with a specific focus on gut microbiota–derived metabolites. Thus, extending the target article, we provide recommendations to the field to increase reproducibility and relevance of this type of MGB study.

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by (...) a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed. (shrink)

In four experiments, we offer evidence that virtues are often judged as uniquely important for some business practices (e.g., hospital management and medical error investigation). Overall, actions done only from virtue (either by organizations or individuals) were judged to feel better, to be more praiseworthy, to be more morally right, and to be associated with more trustworthy leadership and greater personal life satisfaction compared to actions done only to produce the best consequences or to follow the correct moral rule. These (...) results accord with claims made by some virtue ethicists. The current data contribute to a small but growing body of literature emphasizing both empirical soundness and philosophical rigor in the scientific study of virtue. Results also offer some guidance concerning how businesses, employees, and executives are evaluated and perceived. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

In a recent article, Wilkinson puts forward the notion of identity-relative paternalism. According to Wilkinson’s final formulation of this principle, ‘[i]ndividuals should be prevented from doing to future selves (where there are weakened prudential unity relations between the current and future self) what it would be justified to prevent them from doing to others’.1 In medical ethics, it is usually assumed that hard paternalism, that is, acting against a competent person’s wishes for their own benefit, is not justified. According to (...) Mill’s harm principle, we may only limit people’s freedom if they cause harm to others.2 Harm to self is not a sufficient reason for overriding competent persons’ decisions. Wilkinson, however, draws on Parfit’s reductionist view of personal identity to argue that sometimes, patients’ future selves are sufficiently disconnected from their present selves to treat future selves like different persons. If a competent person’s medical decision negatively affects a future self, this should be treated like a case of harm to others. Thus, overriding competent persons’ decisions in such cases—and treating them against their will—could be justified. In this commentary, I point out two problems with this approach. First, I demonstrate that the cases Wilkinson’s argument is based on are not examples of harm to others but rather cases of surrogate decision making gone wrong, …. (shrink)

This study shows that professional identity should not be viewed as a composed variable with a uniform structure. Based on the literature and previous research, we view teachers? job satisfaction, self?efficacy, occupational commitment and change in the level of motivation as indicators of teachers? professional identity. Using two?step cluster analysis, three distinct professional identity profiles have empirically been identified, based on data of 1214 teachers working in secondary education in the Netherlands. These profiles differed significantly regarding the indicators of teachers? (...) professional identity. Teachers belonging to the found profiles did not significantly differ in their amount of experience. (shrink)

Understanding the folk notion of free will and moral responsibility is important for a host of applied and theoretical issues in psychology, philosophy, and ethics. The bulk of experimental research has focused on folk intuitions concerning determinism's relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, determinism is a difficult term for many folk to understand. Accordingly researchers often use comprehension questions to identify and exclude large proportions of participants who seem to struggle with relevant concepts. Here, we document some of (...) the cognitive mechanisms involved in folk judgments related to comprehension of determinism, and its relations to free will and moral responsibility. Results provide prescriptions for experimental designs that can increase comprehension, potentially decreasing sampling biases. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed. (shrink)

Les atlas linguistiques sont-ils des corpus? Nous voudrions ici montrer pourquoi certains atlas ne sont pas des corpus et comment leur informatisation pourrait, néanmoins, permettre de les exploiter comme tels. Le questionnement auquel font écho ces lignes est celui de la possibilité d’une informatisation de l’Atlas linguistique de la Wallonie (ALW), envisagée dans un premier temps comme l’intégration d’échantillons des publications dans des bases de données, exploitables via une interface de consultation en ligne. Ce travail consisterait à réduire la matière (...) de l’enquête qui avait été enrichie lors de l’édition des matériaux. Cependant, nous voudrions montrer la part d’analyse qu’il est souhaitable de conserver lors de cette réduction. (shrink)

This paper enquires into the politics of real-time in online media. It suggests that real-time cannot be accounted for as a universal temporal frame in which events happen, but explores the making of real-time from a device perspective focusing on the temporalities of platforms. Based on an empirical study exploring the pace at which various online media produce new content, we trace the different rhythms, patterns or tempos created by the interplay of devices, users’ web activities and issues. What emerges (...) are distinct forms of ‘realtimeness’ which are not external from but specific to devices, organized through socio-technical arrangements and practices of use. Realtimeness thus unflattens more general accounts of the real-time web and research, and draws attention to the agencies built into specific platform temporalities and the political economies of making real-time. (shrink)

Reasoning about bedrock abstract concepts such as time, number, and valence relies on spatial metaphor and often on multiple spatial metaphors for a single concept. Previous research has documented, for instance, both future-in-front and future-to-right metaphors for time in English speakers. It is often assumed that these metaphors, which appear to have distinct experiential bases, remain distinct in online temporal reasoning. In two studies we demonstrate that, contra this assumption, people systematically combine these metaphors. Evidence for this combination was found (...) in both directly elicited and spontaneous co-speech gestures about time. These results provide first support for the hypothesis that the metaphorical representation of time, and perhaps other abstract domains as well, involves the continuous co-activation of multiple metaphors rather than the selection of only one. (shrink)

In several jurisdictions, irremediable suffering from a medical condition is a legal requirement for access to assisted dying. According to the expressivist objection, allowing assisted dying for a specific group of persons, such as those with irremediable medical conditions, expresses the judgment that their lives are not worth living. While the expressivist objection has often been used to argue that assisted dying should not be legalised, I show that there is an alternative solution available to its proponents. An autonomy-based approach (...) to assisted suicide regards the provision of assisted suicide (but not euthanasia) as justified when it is autonomously requested by a person, irrespective of whether this is in her best interests. Such an approach has been put forward by a recent judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which understands assisted suicide as an expression of the person’s right to a self-determined death. It does not allow for beneficence-based restrictions regarding the person’s suffering or medical diagnosis and therefore avoids the expressivist objection. I argue that on an autonomy-based approach, assisted suicide should not be understood as a medical procedure but rather as the person’s autonomous action. (shrink)

Article published in Stance by Wolfe and Grosz.

Abstract[I] want to single out one phenomenon that could be called the ‘politics of sources’. It points to the extent to which the histories that both scientists and historians can write are artifacts of the available sources. The Rockefeller Foundation not only opened its archives very early on for historical work but also invested a lot in making the archives readily available for historical exploration. During the 1980s, many young historians took advantage of this opportunity. Thus, in a relatively early (...) phase of the professional historiography of molecular biology, one could have gained the impression that the development of the new biology as a whole was a bio‐politically directed enterprise of the Rockefeller Foundation sustained by the vision that social processes could ultimately be controlled by biological processes. (shrink)

We explore and provide an account for a recently identified judgment anomaly, i.e., an order effect that changes the strength of intentionality ascriptions for some side effects (e.g., when a chairman's pursuit of profits has the foreseen but unintended consequence of harming the environment). Experiment 1 replicated the previously unanticipated order effect anomaly controlling for general individual differences. Experiment 2 revealed that the order effect was multiply determined and influenced by factors such as beliefs (i.e., that the same actor was (...) involved in bringing about both good and bad side effects) and philosophical training (i.e., more training was associated with smaller differences in judgment when harm followed help). Results provide more evidence that the folk's philosophically relevant intuitions are predictably fragmented and depend on the dynamic interplay between persons, process, and environments. Methodological and theoretical implications are discussed. (shrink)

While we often talk about time using spatial terms, experimental investigation of space-time associations has focused primarily on the space in front of the participant. This has had two consequences: the disregard of the space behind the participant and the creation of potential task demands produced by spatialized manual button-presses. We introduce and test a new paradigm that uses auditory stimuli and vocal responses to address these issues. Participants made temporal judgments about deictic or sequential relationships presented auditorily along a (...) body-centered sagittal or transversal axis. Results involving the transversal axis replicated previous work while sagittal axis results were surprising. Deictic judgments did not use the sagittal axis but sequential judgments did, in a previously undocumented way. Participants associated earlier judgments with the space in front of them and later judgments with the space behind them. These findings, using a new approach, p.. (shrink)

Pessimism over a democracy’s ability to produce good outcomes is as longstanding as democracy itself. On one hand, democratic theorists consider democracy to be the only legitimate form of government on the basis that it alone promotes or safeguards intrinsic values like freedom, equality, and justice. On the other, skepticism toward the ordinary citizen’s cognitive capacities remains a perennial concern. Qualms about the epistemic value of democracy have only been made more pertinent by a fundamental problem of deep epistemic disagreement (...) which underlies the post-truth phenomenon. I argue that the democratic theorists who have sought to defend democracy on epistemic grounds have thus far neglected such deep and intractable disagreements. Without addressing this oversight, the epistemic democrat will find that collective decision-making processes quickly become paralyzed and will not be able to yield the epistemic benefits they promise. Hence, the work for epistemic democrats is to recognize and take into account the ramifications of epistemic disagreements so as to make a stronger case for epistemic democracy. (shrink)

Interviews with female impersonators reveal the social, cultural, and economic aspects of their occupation and the subculture of the homosexual transvestite.

ResumenLas aventuras de Pinocho es uno de esos pocos cuentos que no solo ha resistido al paso del tiempo, sino que se incorporó a la cultura y 139 años después, sigue recreándose en versiones literarias, cinematográficas, teatrales, plásticas, incluso pedagógicas. En este artículo tratamos de levantar algunos de los velos con los que Disney cubrió una parte importante de la historia dejando fuera, por ejemplo, el tema de la pobreza. Hoy nos preguntamos si un producto cultural como Las aventuras de (...) Pinocho puede detonar conversaciones y reflexiones con niños de hoy, y si la escuela puede apropiarse de este material para filosofar con los alumnos e incluso con los adultos. ¿Por qué en un mundo de malhechores que roban, engañan, cocinan, venden o cuelgan a los niños, la mirada reprobatoria está fija en un niño que dice mentiras? ¿Qué experiencias tiene que vivir un niño para verse a sí mismo como “malo”? ¿Cuáles son los riesgos de la clasificación, por otro lado, tan necesaria en el conocimiento? Si bien partimos de una experiencia realizada en una escuela de la Ciudad de México, el análisis que se presenta se ocupa principalmente del vínculo entre la(s) lectura(s) y la reflexión filosófica en este cuento.Palabras claveFilosofia con niños Pinocho Educación no formal Pinocchio is one of those few stories that has not only stood the test of time, but continues to be recreated in literary, cinematographic and theatrical versions... Pinocchio is no longer just the story written by Carlo Collodi at the end of the 19th century; over the course of 130 years, the social imaginary has incorporated numerous interpretations. In this article we ask ourselves whether a cultural product such as The Adventures of Pinocchio can trigger conversations and reflections with today's children, and whether the school can appropriate this material to philosophize with students and even with adults. Although we start from an experience carried out in Mexico City, the analysis presented here is mainly concerned with the link between reading and philosophical reflection in this story.Key wordsPhilosophy with children Pinocchio Non-formal education Pinóquio é um dos poucos contos de fadas que não apenas resistiu ao teste do tempo, mas continua a ser recriado em versões literárias, cinematográficas e teatrais... Pinóquio não é mais apenas a história escrita por Carlo Collodi no final do século XIX; ao longo de 130 anos, o imaginário social incorporou inúmeras interpretações. Neste artigo, nos perguntamos se um produto cultural como As Aventuras de Pinóquio pode desencadear conversas e reflexões com as crianças de hoje, e se a escola pode se apropriar desse material para filosofar com os alunos e até mesmo com os adultos. Embora partamos de uma experiência realizada na Cidade do México, a análise apresentada aqui se preocupa principalmente com o vínculo entre a leitura e a reflexão filosófica nessa história.Palavras-chaveFilosofia com crianças Pinóquio Educação não formal. (shrink)

Until now, there has been no theoretical foundation that explains why organizations implement whistle-blowing systems. By understanding whistle-blowing systems as an instrument that is desired by society, the legitimacy theory could be transferred to the whistle-blowing concept. A survey of German managers shows that legitimacy theory may be supported. Further insights into legitimacy theory are given by the motivation for the design of the implemented systems. The survey shows that, in particular, the implementation of external whistle-blowing systems is seemingly not (...) driven by desired effectiveness. This supports legitimacy theory, since it reveals that external systems are symbolic rather than substantive systems. However, the results do not hold for internal whistle-blowing systems because the implementation of internal systems is ostensibly driven by power theories. The results are interesting for the planned statutory whistleblower protection as they reveal a partially restrained attitude toward whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing systems are not effective if management is not convinced of their benefits. (shrink)

Visual aids can improve comprehension of risks associated with medical treatments, screenings, and lifestyles. Do visual aids also help decision makers accurately assess their risk comprehension? That is, do visual aids help them become well calibrated? To address these questions, we investigated the benefits of visual aids displaying numerical information and measured accuracy of self-assessment of diagnostic inferences (i.e., metacognitive judgment calibration) controlling for individual differences in numeracy. Participants included 108 patients who made diagnostic inferences about three medical tests on (...) the basis of information about the sensitivity and false-positive rate of the tests and disease prevalence. Half of the patients received the information in numbers without a visual aid, while the other half received numbers along with a grid representing the numerical information. In the numerical condition, many patients --especially those with low numeracy-- misinterpreted the predictive value of the tests and profoundly overestimated the accuracy of their inferences. Metacognitive judgment calibration mediated the relationship between numeracy and accuracy of diagnostic inferences. In contrast, in the visual aid condition, patients at all levels of numeracy showed high-levels of inferential accuracy and metacognitive judgment calibration. Results indicate that accurate metacognitive assessment may explain the beneficial effects of visual aids and numeracy --a result that accords with theory suggesting that metacognition is an essential part of risk literacy. We conclude that well-designed risk communications can inform patients about health-relevant numerical information while helping them assess the quality of their own risk comprehension. (shrink)